

SECRET-SENSITIVE

-4-

-- The military: After the Shah, Khomeini forces would purge the senior Generals, if any remained in the country. He said a number of officers had come secretly to see Khomeini and he was confident of support within the army. The task of the Islamic Republic would be to educate the army to a national mission rather than one of protecting the Shah.

Yazdi said the Islamic Republic would probably cancel many arms sales contracts as they did not serve Iran's interests. It would pay its debts for any contracts that were cancelled. He said the new Government would be happy to buy tractors instead from the U.S.

-- The future of the Shah: I described a number of arrangements ranging to the "King of Sweden model" which might be adopted to preserve a position for the Shah. Yazdi was uncompromising. The Shah must go and his system must be abolished. We were dealing with a mass revolution. If Khomeini argued that the Shah could stay with reduced powers, he would be rejected by his followers.

Would it be possible for a Sanjabi to negotiate a new government? Would Khomeini accept that? "No."

Wasn't it necessary to keep the Shah in order to preserve military discipline and prevent civil war? Yazdi was confident that once the Shah was gone, Iran's problems would be solved and the military would have no choice but to sign up with the Islamic Republic.

-- The U.S. Role: The U.S. was crucial, Yazdi said. If the U.S. withdrew its support of the Shah, he would fall immediately. If the support continued, the U.S. would suffer the same fate as the Shah in Iran. Would the Ayatollah call for violence against Americans if he called for a holy war on Shah's regime? That was a real possibility, Yazdi said, particularly, if the U.S. continued to make statements such as the President's statement of December 12. He could not, of course, control all of the Iranians who were in a rage in any event.

SECRET-SENSITIVE

SECRET-SENSITIVE

-5-

What about Khomeini's threat to cancel oil contracts with the U.S.? That would depend, Yazdi said, on how the U.S. performed between now and the day that the Shah fell.

On parting, we agreed that neither of us would acknowledge that there had been any official contact between Khomeini and the U.S. Government.

Comment

All of this sounds naive. It is, but it is also deeply felt. I had the impression that the Khomeini organization is very amateurish in its handling of PR and contacts with foreigners. But, clearly, they know how to operate in Iran in a way that the Shah's people have forgotten.

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